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The (Lack of) Gender Dynamics of Gubernatorial Executive Orders* 
YU OUYANG 
Purdue University Northwest 
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University of Tampa 
ABSTRACT 
How do governors utilize state executive orders to effect policy changes? 
Are there differences between male and female governors? Though 
various works have examined the dynamics of presidential executive 
orders, few have examined how governors employ executive orders at the 
state level. We present results of a pilot study on how gender influences 
use of gubernatorial executive orders. Contrary to much of the literature 
on gender dynamics, we find minimal differences in the ways that female 
and male governors use gubernatorial executive orders. Female governors 
do not appear to rely more or less on unilateral orders than do their male 
colleagues. Although we do find some evidence that female governors are 
less likely to issue cultural and economic executive orders than social-
issue and public-health executive orders, the difference between female 
and male governors across most issue areas is minimal. These results have 
important implications on studies of gender dynamics, the unilateral 
executive, and gubernatorial behavior. 
KEY WORDS  Gender Dynamics; Executive Orders; Gubernatorial Decision Making 
Despite recent advances in electing female candidates at the federal and state levels, the 
number of states led by female governors remains small. As of April 2017, only four 
states had governors who were female: New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Rhode 
Island. Overall, a total of 37 women have served as governors in 27 states. By 
comparison, Congress had a total of 104 female members in 2017, with 21 in the U.S. 
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Senate and 83 in the U.S. House of Representatives. Surprisingly, although multiple 
works examine how gender affects elite behavior across a variety of contexts (Anzia and 
Berry 2011; Dolan 2000; Dolan 2011; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003), scant attention 
has been given to the differences between male and female governors. (For an exception, 
see Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012.) To help address this gap in the literature, we will 
report the results of a pilot project on how gender affects the dynamics of gubernatorial 
executive orders.  
A better understanding of how governors employ unilateral actions at the state 
level is important. A review of gubernatorial actions suggests that uses of state executive 
orders are expansive. Governors have issued executive orders to address a variety of issue 
areas, including healthcare policies (Gakh, Vernick, and Rutkow 2013; Schneider 1989), 
consensus building and dispute resolution (Carlson 2000), antidiscrimination policies in 
the workplace (Colvin 2000), gay rights (Klawitter and Flatt 1998), and policies that 
affect state agencies (Ryan 1978; Woods 2004). Moreover, various studies suggest not 
only that female governors prioritize certain policy areas more so than do male governors 
(see, for instance, Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003) but 
also that females tend to be more collaborative and to sponsor and cosponsor 
significantly more legislation than do their male colleagues (Anzia and Berry 2011).  
To determine whether gender influences gubernatorial behaviors, we examine 
executive orders across seven states, limiting the period to 1959–2017 because of data 
constraints. Contrary to existing literature on gender differences, our findings suggest that 
even after controlling for situational, political, and economic factors, female governors 
are not more or less prone to unilateral activity than their male colleagues. Moreover, 
although we do find some evidence that female governors are less likely to issue cultural 
and economic executive orders than social-issue and public-health executive orders, the 
difference between female and male governors across most issue areas is minimal.  
GENDER AND THE GOVERNORSHIP 
Our main goal in this article is to examine whether female governors use executive orders 
differently than do their fellow male governors. Though most studies on executive orders 
and unilateral actions have focused on U.S. presidents (see, for instance, Bolton and 
Thrower 2016; Howell 2003; Ouyang and Waterman 2015; Warber 2006), a small 
number of works on gubernatorial executive orders has begun to accumulate. For 
example, McLaughlin et al. (2010) reported a massive data-collection effort to create a 
comprehensive public-policy database for the State of Pennsylvania, which includes state 
executive orders since 1979. Similarly, Rivera and Wagner (2010) examined the 
tendency of New Jersey governors to use executive orders as policy instruments. 
Although insightful, these studies remain limited in that they speak to only a single 
state’s propensity for executive orders. 
Taking a more comprehensive approach to the study of governors and state 
executive orders, Ferguson and Bowling (2008) provided an initial examination of 
executive orders across 49 states from 2004 and 2005. Although they did not subject the 
data to rigorous empirical tests, Ferguson and Bowling nonetheless found that executive 
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orders are frequently used by governors for a variety of policy areas. More recently, 
Barber, Bolton, and Thrower (2016) proposed a theory of executive unilateral policy-
making that highlights inter- and intra-branch ideological conflicts. Their work suggests 
that while ideological disagreements between the executive and legislative branches can 
constrain unilateral actions, this constraint is contingent on low levels of legislative 
polarization and a party’s ability to overcome supermajority barriers.  
Surprisingly, while gubernatorial executive orders have received greater interest 
in the literature, to our knowledge, no study has examined the degree to which female 
governors employ unilateral authority differently than male governors. As the chief 
executive of her state, a female governor is in a unique position to advance policies for 
her female constituents, acting as an advocate. Moreover, by strategically using executive 
orders when possible, female governors are able to overcome the many legislative 
barriers that often limit policy-making. The question, however, is do they?  
Scholars have devoted considerable energy to the study of gender across a mix of 
contexts. The ability to take on such executive positions comes at a cost. First and 
foremost, women face unique challenges in the workplace. Such women, especially those 
in executive positions, are much more likely to sacrifice their personal lives in order to 
maintain such positions. Compared to men in high positions, female executives are more 
likely to forsake having children and are less likely to sustain personal relationships, 
despite their desire to have such (Hewlett 2002). In addition, in high executive marketing 
positions, females have been proven to have higher levels of ethical judgment than their 
male counterparts (Akaah 1989). This possibly limits female growth within companies, 
depending on their individual morality. 
Second, various studies indicate that women behave differently than men. For 
example, female legislators tend to prioritize different policies than do male legislators. 
They tend to place higher priority on women’s rights issues, depending on their 
representation in the legislature, but not on legislation that is central to the benefit of 
children and families (Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003). Men and women have different 
leadership styles, and when they go against stereotypical gender-related leadership 
strategies, they are ineffective as leaders (Eagly and Johannsen-Schmidt 2001). Women 
suffer some disadvantages from prejudicial evaluations of their competence as leaders, 
especially in masculine organizational contexts if they are unable to produce masculine 
traits on policies that are perceived as male-dominated. Women do have some advantages 
in typical leadership style, however; for example, they are more likely to communicate 
and understand as well as to provide a strong sense of community for those who are their 
subordinates (Eagly and Carli 2003).  
Why might female legislators emphasize different issue priorities than their male 
counterparts? Works in the psychology of gender differences suggest that one reason may 
be the varying level of empathy expressed by females, compared to males. In their study 
of adolescents, Van der Graaff et al. (2014) found that girls are consistently more 
empathetic than boys throughout their life-spans. Boys’ empathy levels, however, 
fluctuate as they develop from childhood into adolescence.  
Behavioral science literature also suggests further differences between females 
and males. According to Juvrud and Rennels (2017), two stereotypical pathways 
102  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences  Vol. 21 (2018)  
influence help-seeking behavior among both men and women: the attitudinal pathway 
and the personally endorsed pathway. The attitudinal pathway is the idea that an 
individual’s beliefs about others influence that person’s own gender identity. The 
personally endorsed pathway represents the notion that an individual experiences interest 
in a person, object, or event before the individual’s gender identity is set in stone. Results 
indicate that the personally endorsed gender stereotype predicts the extent to which 
women seek help, whereas both attitudinal and personally endorsed gender stereotypes 
predict male help-seeking behaviors. 
Perhaps reflecting the innate differences between genders, the public—via the 
media—perceive important gender differences between men and women. For one, gender 
gap is especially prominent in the media coverage of female candidates: Women are 
more likely to receive more gender-related coverage, especially when running for high 
offices (Meeks 2012). This indicates that female politicians running for high office have 
less salient issue-dominated media coverage, because the media focuses on their gender; 
however, women gain a strategic advantage when they run “as women,” stressing issues 
that voters associate favorably with female candidates and targeting female voters 
(Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003).  
Gender perceptions also affect both peer and self-evaluations of female managers. 
Men rate themselves as more effective than women rate themselves (Paustian-Underdahl, 
Walker, and Woehr 2014). Women and older managers are less inclined to define career 
success in terms of hierarchical and financial progression, as they are more likely to have 
individual value-based ideas about what success in a career amounts to (Sturges 1999). 
Ratings by subordinates within various companies indicate that female and male 
executives engaged in greater amounts of leader behavior valued by top management 
than by the typical employee. Female middle managers and executives were rated higher 
when compared to their male counterparts in interpersonal, goal-driven, and task-oriented 
leadership styles (Bartol, Martin, and Kromkowski, 2003).  
Gender stereotypes affect how voters search for information of female and male 
candidates for office. Voters seek more competence-based information about female 
candidates than they do for male candidates, in addition to seeking increased information 
related to “compassion issues.” Statistical analysis provides evidence that female 
candidates are disadvantaged in the Democratic Party; Republican women are still at a 
disadvantage in elections, however. Overall, voters seek out more competency-based 
information on female candidates, especially Republicans (Ditonto, Hamilton, and 
Redlawsk 2014).  
Although many studies indicate that females behave differently than their male 
counterparts, some suggest otherwise. Using analyzed speeches, Herrera and Shafer 
(2011) have found evidence that there is no difference in policy agenda between male and 
female governors, although their study did find that male governors are slightly more 
likely than females to address education in speeches. They also found that male 
governors were covered more by the media in social and welfare issues than were female 
governors. In contrast, Ferrara (2012) found that there is no difference in the policy 
agenda of male and female governors. This may imply that the greater the office, the less 
divergent the agendas because of institutional restraints.  
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Analysis controlling for gender and political party again found that female 
Democratic governors prioritize some policy areas differently than their male 
counterparts do but that in other areas, their policy agendas are identical; however, there 
were no identifiable policy differences based on gender among Republican governors 
(Shafer and Herrera 2010). Female governors in general perceived a double standard 
applied to their leadership: They received less support from their colleagues within their 
political parties, as well as more criticism and inequitable coverage from media. All 
women in another study reported an inability to discuss gender-related leadership issues 
for fear of handicapping their administrations and being perceived as lesser leaders 
(Havens 2012).   
Debate on whether, and the extent to which, gender differences exist also extends 
to work in psychological sciences. In neuropsychology and cognitive development, for 
instance, scholars remain conflicted about whether a gender gap exists. According to 
Ardila et al. (2011), only minimal, statistically insignificant, gender differences exist 
during cognitive development. These cognitive differences that result from gender show 
up in only a small number of tests and account for a low percentage of score variance. In 
comparison, Yeo et al. (2016) suggest that women display higher verbal ability, which 
entails understanding commands, language expression, and language comprehension; 
meanwhile, men have a higher spatial ability, which entails being able to comprehend 
verbal-spatial terms, such as directions, and recognizing objects at various angles. These 
results overall are statistically insignificant, however, meaning that there is little 
psychological difference.  
Taken together, it is not immediately clear whether female governors will utilize 
unilateral actions differently than men will. Although scholars note that female governors 
have different policy interests and emphasize policy agendas in their State of the State 
addresses (Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012), there is evidence that women in executive 
leadership positions tend to govern and behave similarly to men in the same positions. To 
this point, a statement by Bev Perdue, North Carolina’s first female governor, is 
illustrative: “Although I will go down in history as North Carolina’s first female 
governor, I want to make history as a governor who faced the challenges and made the 
right decisions to position North Carolina for a competitive global future” (Quoted in 
Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012). As Governor Perdue’s statement makes clear, although 
she recognizes the importance of being the state’s first female governor, she intends to 
govern as the chief executive first and as a female second. The important question here is 
whether these sentiments are unique to Governor Perdue or are common among other 
female executives. Specifically, we ask, “Are female governors more active unilaterally 
than male governors? Do they prioritize different policies unilaterally?” In the following 
sections, we explore these questions. 
DATA AND METHODS 
To explore the differences, if any, between male and female governors and their uses of 
unilateral authority at the state level, we collected data on gubernatorial executive orders 
for Arizona (Jan. 1965–Jan. 2017), New Hampshire (Jan. 1991–Dec. 2016), New Mexico 
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(Jan. 2011–Dec. 2016), Oklahoma (Nov. 1959–Nov. 2016), Oregon (Feb. 2003–ept. 
2016), Rhode Island (Jan. 1973–Jan. 2017), and South Carolina (Mar. 1973–Oct. 2016). 
The appendix provides greater details on the states and governors within the data set. 
Although these seven states represent only a small portion of all gubernatorial executive 
orders in the 50 states, they were selected to maximize variations in state contexts.  
First, in all seven states, a female either was the sitting governor or had recently 
served as governor at the time of the study. Currently, four states have female governors: 
Rhode Island (Gina Raimondo–D), New Mexico (Susana Martinez–R), Oregon (Kate 
Brown–D), and Oklahoma (Mary Fallin–R). Margaret “Maggie” Hassan–D (New 
Hampshire) left the governor’s office to become a U.S. senator, and Nikki Haley–R 
(South Carolina) was appointed by President Trump to the post of U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations.  
Second, authorization for executive orders differs across states. Although 
governors in all 50 states are authorized to issue executive orders, the basis for those 
gubernatorial orders may vary. For instance, based on an October 2015 survey of 
governors’ offices by the Council of State Government (Council of State Government 
2016), whereas governors of Arizona and Oregon are authorized to issue executive 
orders based on implied powers, the governors of New Hampshire and South Carolina 
have statutory authorizations for executive orders. The governor of New Mexico can 
issue orders on the basis of the state constitution and state statutes. Oklahoma 
governors are granted the authority by the state constitution to issue executive orders, 
and Rhode Island governors can issue executive orders based on state statutes, implied 
powers, and case laws.  
The main dependent variable in this study is the number of executive orders 
issued monthly. In addition to gender (our main variable of interest), we also account for 
a number of factors that may affect the level of unilateral activities at the state level. First, 
we include a set of variables to account for differences across governors and the 
transitions across administrations. Studies in executive unilateralism at the federal level 
have long recognized that Democratic and Republican presidents utilize executive orders 
differently (see, for instance, Howell and Lewis 2002; Ouyang and Waterman 2015). We 
thus include a dummy variable for whether a Democratic governor is currently in office. 
We also add dummy variables for whether the governor is in the first six and the last six 
months of her term, as transition periods and the first several months of a new 
administration mark critical junctures as the state transitions from one administration to 
another (Sherwood and Chackerian 1988).  
The extent to which governors use executive orders may depend on political 
contexts. In his formal treatment of executive orders, Howell (2003) suggests that 
presidents are more likely to act unilaterally when seeking to preempt legislature actions 
or when Congress is poised to enact policies that diverge considerably from the 
presidents’ preferences. Scholars find similar results at the state level. For instance, 
Clarke (1998) finds that divided government and polarization affect budgetary conflicts 
between governors and legislatures. Thus, we include variables for party polarization in 
the lower (house) and upper (senate) chambers of the state legislature, divided 
government, and the percentage of legislators within the governor’s party. 
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Third, we account for the extent to which state economic conditions may affect 
unilateral actions by governors. Studies on vote intentions indicate that voters may 
employ a retrospective evaluation of the state’s economic conditions when casting votes 
for the governor’s office (Partin 1995). To the extent that governors recognize the 
importance of the economy on vote choice during election time, they may be apt to 
employ unilateral strategies during economic downturns. To account for such possibility, 
we include controls for gross state product and state unemployment rate. Last, we control 
for total state population to account for variations in size of the states.  
STATISTICAL FINDINGS 
Table 1 presents the results of random effects negative binomial regression models, 
which account for the hierarchical structure and over dispersion in the data. The 
dependent variable in each case is the number of executive orders issued monthly. Each 
model contains a binary variable for gender, as well as the lagged total number of 
executive orders to account for autocorrelations. In addition, each model also includes 
fixed indicators for states to account for further state variations not included in the model. 
The Governors Model (Model 1) is the simplest model and includes variables to indicate 
whether a Democratic governor is currently in office, the last six months of the 
governor’s administration, the first six months of the administration, and the total months 
that the governor has served in office. The Political Model (Model 2) adds controls for 
political divisions and polarization in state legislatures. The State Model (Model 3) adds 
controls to account for state economic conditions. Finally, the Full Model (Model 4) 
combines all variables from Models 1–3. 
Overall, we find no differences in the use of gubernatorial executive orders by 
female vs. male governors (Model 4). Our main variable (a binary indicator for female) is 
statistically significant in only the Governors Model. Controlling solely for whether a 
Democratic governor is currently in office, for their first and last six months office, and 
for how long the governor has been in office, we find that female governors issue a 
greater number of executive orders than their male counterparts;however, this 
relationship between gender and the level of executive orders disappears when we 
include additional controls for state political and economic contexts.  
Use of executive orders also relates to the timing of an administration. Governors 
are especially active during the beginning of administrations, issuing about four times as 
many executive orders during the first six months, compared to all other moments of their 
administrations. This is consistent with studies in the unilateral presidency, which 
suggests that presidents may issue a greater number of executive orders during the first 
and last years of their administrations as they seek to undo and change actions by their 
predecessors (for incoming presidents) or to further solidify their policy agendas before 
leaving office (for outgoing administrations). Although we find evidence that governors 
are more active unilaterally during the beginning months of their administrations, we find 
no evidence that governors make last-ditch attempts at unilateral behavior as they prepare 
to leave office.  
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Table 1. Models for “Female Governors Do Not Issue a Greater Number of 
Executive Orders” 
Governors Political State Full 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female .37*** –.05 .09 .05 
(.06) (.16) (.10) (.17) 
 Democratic –.13* .28* .05 .27* 
governor (.05) (.11) (.05) (.13) 
 Last 6 months .14+ .12 .16+ .12 
(.08) (.13) (.09) (.13) 
 First 6 months 1.43*** 1.48*** 1.44*** 1.40*** 
(.09) (.12) (.09) (.12) 
 Months in office –.03*** –.03*** –.03*** –.03*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Party polarization 
(house) 
–1.05**
(.41)
–.61 
(.55) 
 Party polarization 
(senate) 
.84* 
(.34)
.88* 
(.39) 
 Divided –.26+ –.12 
government (.15) (.15) 
 % of legislators in 
governor’s party 
–.01
(.01)
0.00 
(.01) 
 State population –.75** –4.43**
(log) (.27) (1.64)
 Gross state product 
(log) 
.47***
(.07) 
.88* 
(.38)
 % state –.01 .04+
unemployment (.01) (.02)
     New Hampshire .47 –1.08+ –.28 –6.01**
(.45) (.61) (.57) (2.00)
 New Mexico –.51+ .82 –1.03* –3.01+
(.30) (.70) (.41) (1.58)
 Oklahoma –2.17*** –2.84*** –2.46*** –3.78***
(.20) (.45) (.23) (.54)
Concluded next page 
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Table 1. Models for “Female Governors Do Not Issue a Greater Number of 
Executive Orders,” concl. 
Governors Political State Full 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oregon .73* .30 .26 –1.22+
(.34) (.52) (.42) (.69)
 Rhode Island .28 –.07 –.36 –4.95**
(.20) (.61) (.36) (1.88)
 South Carolina –.26 .13 –.27 –.28
(.18) (.37) (.19) (.39)
 # of EOs issued .13*** .07*** .12*** .07***
(lag 1) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
 Constant –2.41*** –.54 .68 49.88*
(.15) (.77) (3.06) (19.85)
ln(r) 
  Constant 1.20* 1.68* 1.22* 1.65* 
(.58) (.72) (.60) (.73) 
ln(s) 
  Constant 1.23* 1.33+ 1.17+ 1.29+ 
(.60) (.71) (.62) (.72) 
Obs. 2901 1089 2688 1089 
# of Groups 7 7 7 7 
Min. group obs. 71 11 47 11 
Max. group obs. 684 228 612 228 
Log-likelihood –4081.07 –1615.14 –3690.21 –1608.89
AIC 8192.15 3268.29 7416.42 3261.78 
BIC 8281.74 3363.16 7522.56 3371.63 
Notes: Random effects negative binomial models fitted. 
The dependent variable in all four models is the number of gubernatorial executive orders issued 
(monthly).  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Arizona omitted.  
AIC=Akaike information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion; EO=executive order; 
obs.=observation. 
+p < 0.1 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
Consistent with results from study of the unilateral presidency (Ouyang and 
Waterman 2015), we find that the level of executive unilateralism is related to ideology. 
We find that Democratic governors issue more executive orders than do Republicans. 
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Controlling for variations in political and economic contexts, the Full Model indicates 
that, on average, Democratic governors issue nearly twice as many executive orders 
than do Republican governors.  
We find only weak relations between political contexts and unilateral 
behavior. Results from the Full Model suggest that the presence of divided 
government is not related to the number of executive orders issued monthly. Although 
party polarization in the legislature is related to executive actions by the governor, it 
is limited to polarization in the senate, excluding the house. This is somewhat 
surprising, given that model-fit statistics indicate that the Political Model (not 
including controls for economic conditions) does nearly as good a job in predicting 
monthly executive orders activity as the Full Model does. Although fully assessing 
the relationship between political polarization and executive orders is beyond the 
scope of this article, recent evidence from other works suggest that the extent to 
which ideological polarization relates to exercise of executive order is more nuanced 
than presented here (Barber et al. 2016). 
Regarding the effect of economic conditions influencing executive orders at 
the state level, there are mixed results. Based on studies of economic retrospective 
evaluations and vote intentions, we suspected that governors may attempt to use 
unilateral directives to act quickly during economic downturns in the face of 
legislative gridlocks. All else being equal, we find that governors issue a greater 
number of executive orders as the gross state product increases and as state 
unemployment rate raises, respectively. This is perplexing, as it suggests that 
governors issue more executive orders when economic conditions in the state improve 
and when the economy worsens.1 Although we cannot fully ascertain why this is the 
case, we suspect that one possible explanation is the limited number of states included 
in our data set.  
It may be the case that gender differences and executive orders become 
apparent only when we examine across policy areas. For instance, (Heidbreder and 
Scheurer (2012) find that female governors prioritize social-welfare policies in their 
State of the State speeches, compared to male governors. Using data on all Rhode 
Island executive orders from 1973 to 2017, we examine whether female governors use 
executive orders to emphasize certain issues areas more than others. 
Rhode Island executive orders present a unique case suitable for assessing 
executive orders across policy areas. In addition to making all executive order 
publicly available via the Secretary of State’s website, Rhode Island codes each 
executive order in relation to the policy it addresses. For our purpose, the original 
policy areas provided are too specific: Rhode Island provides coding for a total of 98 
policy areas, with some policy areas containing only one or two executive orders. We 
recoded these 98 issues into seven more-manageable areas of policy focus: (1) state 
government and administration, (2) transportation and infrastructure, (3) environment 
and natural resources, (4) law and public safety, (5) economy, (6) social issues and 
public health, and (7) culture. For example, executive orders dealing with airports, 
boats, bridges, and highways were recoded into a single category that we denote as 
transportation and infrastructure.  
Ouyang and Carpentier  Gubernatorial Executive Orders  109 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
 V
ar
ia
tio
ns
 in
 U
ni
la
te
ra
l A
ct
iv
ism
 a
cr
os
s I
ss
ue
 A
re
as
So
cia
l I
ss
ue
s &
Pu
bl
ic 
H
ea
lth
C
ult
ur
e
Ec
on
om
y
En
vir
on
m
en
t
La
w
 &
 O
rd
er
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
In
fra
str
uc
tu
re
(5
)
Ra
im
on
do
0.
05
–1
3.
65
**
*
–1
.1
8*
**
0.
17
–.
05
0.
07
0.
47
-0
.1
7
-1
.3
5
-0
.2
3
-0
.1
4
-0
.3
-0
.2
1
-0
.3
7
D
em
oc
ra
tic
–.
09
–.
84
0.
04
0.
07
0.
13
0.
11
0.
31
go
ve
rn
or
-0
.1
9
-0
.8
4
-0
.2
2
-0
.4
3
-0
.3
4
-0
.1
5
-0
.3
1
La
st 
6 
m
on
th
s
.4
8*
0.
35
–.
32
–.
06
–.
43
**
–1
.7
8*
–1
5.
38
**
*
-0
.2
-0
.4
4
-0
.4
-0
.5
8
-0
.1
7
-0
.7
3
-0
.7
8
Fi
rs
t 6
 m
on
th
s
–.
34
–1
4.
57
**
*
0.
12
–.
40
0.
37
1.
04
+
0.
34
-0
.4
3
-0
.9
2
-0
.4
9
-0
.4
1
-0
.5
4
-0
.6
-0
.6
4
C
on
sta
nt
–.
79
**
*
–3
.1
9*
**
–.
71
**
*
–.
51
–.
65
*
–.
89
**
*
–2
.0
3*
**
-0
.1
7
-0
.4
2
-0
.2
1
-0
.3
6
-0
.3
3
-0
.0
6
-0
.2
3
N
81
1
ps
eu
do
 R
2
0.
00
6
AI
C
99
9.
36
BI
C
10
18
.1
6
N
ot
es
: 
Ba
se
lin
e 
ca
te
go
ry
 fo
r t
he
 m
ul
tin
om
ia
l r
eg
re
ss
io
n 
is
 s
oc
ia
l-i
ss
ue
s 
an
d 
pu
bl
ic
-h
ea
lth
 e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
or
de
rs
.
St
an
da
rd
 e
rro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
A
IC
=A
ka
ik
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
cr
ite
rio
n;
 B
IC
=B
ay
es
ia
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
cr
ite
rio
n.
+ p
 <
 0
.1
*p
 <
 0
.0
5
**
p
 <
 0
.0
1
**
*p
 <
 0
.0
01
M
ul
tin
om
ia
l L
og
ist
ic 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
(6
)
81
1
0.
01
5
27
49
27
81
.8
9
110  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences  Vol. 21 (2018)  
Before discussing the results of our examination, we want to acknowledge one 
limitation of the data and results presented here. Although executive orders presented 
here span 1973–2017 and were issued by a mixture of both Democratic and Republican 
governors, only a single female governor, Gina Raimondo, is in the data set. In essence, 
then, we compare whether Governor Raimondo prioritized different policy areas in her 
executive orders in relation to her male predecessors. Although this limits our ability to 
generalize to other cases, we nonetheless find some evidence that female governors do 
prioritize some policy areas more than others.  
Table 2 presents the results of two models assessing the gubernatorial executive 
orders across different policy areas, including social issues and public health, culture, 
economy, environment, law and order, government, and infrastructure.2 The unit of 
analysis here is a single executive order. Model 5 reports the results of a logistic 
regression model. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the executive order relates to 
social issues and public health; otherwise, it is coded 0. Model 6 reports the results of a 
multinomial regression. The omitted baseline comparison category is social issues and 
public health.  
Overall, we find that Governor Raimondo was not more likely to issue more 
social and public-health executive order than were her male counterparts (Model 5), 
though she was less likely to use her unilateral authority to address cultural and economic 
issues than on social issues. Contrary to existing works, we find no evidence that female 
governors are more likely to issue social-issue executive orders (Model 5). Although 
governors in general are more likely to issue social-issue executive orders during the last 
six months of their administrations (as they prepare to leave office), female governors 
overall are not more active in this policy area. Comparing our results to those indicating 
that female governors will devote more attention to social issues in their State of the State 
addresses (Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012), this suggests that political rhetoric does not 
necessarily translate into policy action.  
Compared to social-issue executive orders and her male predecessors, however, 
we found that Governor Raimondo issued significantly fewer executive orders on cultural 
and economic issues. For instance, Governor Raimondo was three times less likely to 
issue an economic executive order than social and public-health executive orders. In sum, 
though we find some evidence that Raimondo prioritized certain issues less than social 
issues (cultural and economic), the results overall suggest minimal differences between 
Raimondo and fellow male governors when it comes to social policies.  
CONCLUSION 
Over past decades, the number of females holding the highest executive offices in states 
has steadily increased, and women are now regularly in contention for governors’ 
mansions. This rise of females in the chief executive offices across states has not resulted 
in a similar increase in research on female governors, however. Furthermore, although 
existing studies point to how gender affects the behavior of female legislators, it is 
unclear whether gender affects governors and gubernatorial executive orders. 
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To fill this gap in literature about state politics and governors, our research 
addresses whether gender affects unilateral policy-making at the state level. Contrary to 
much of the existing work on gender dynamics, we find little to no evidence that female 
governors use their unilateral authority differently than do their male colleagues. Female 
governors do not issue more executive orders, nor do they seem to use executive orders 
for traditionally women’s-rights issues.  
Our analysis indicates the importance of additional work in this area. Given the 
amount of literature indicating that female political elites differ from their male 
colleagues in important ways, we are surprised that we find no gender differences. As 
females continue to become more competitive in elections for top executive positions in 
the states, it is essential that we better understand the extent to which gender influences 
gubernatorial policy-making.  
Our pilot study is an important first step in understanding the nature of state-level 
executive orders and gender differences in the governor’s office. Of course, as with many 
studies, our results also raise many questions. For example, why do we find that 
governors issue more executive orders both as the gross state product increases and as 
state unemployment rate increases? One possibility is that the static measures of 
economic performance that we used in the models are too general to pick the subtleties of 
the relationship between gubernatorial orders and the economy. A second potential 
explanation is that although both gross state product and state unemployment rate 
measure economic conditions, they are fundamentally different concepts. It is possible 
that governors utilize executive orders both to grow the state’s economy during times of 
distress (unemployment rate) and to continue to invoke their executive authority to 
further expand the economy as conditions improve (gross state product). Although fully 
assessing this issue is beyond the scope of this article, we will explore these possibilities 
in future projects. 
More intriguing is the null relationship that we find between gender and executive 
authority. In contrast to multiple studies showing that female political elites exhibit 
different policy preferences and behaviors compared to their male counterparts, we find 
little evidence suggesting that female governors employ executive authority differently 
than male governors do. One potential explanation is the limited number of female 
governors included in this study. Though we made a concerted effort to include 
governors (both female and males) from states with diverse political and economic 
conditions, our data set includes data from only seven states. In a follow-up study, we 
intend to expand our data set to include all 50 states. 
An alternative explanation is that gender is not a meaningful explanation for how 
governors utilize executive orders—, our results from a limited sample of states is 
generalizable to gubernatorial executive power in general. Instead, the extent to which 
governors employ executive orders is a function of state-level variations in gubernatorial 
power. In a later project, leveraging new developments in measuring gubernatorial power 
(see Krupnikov and Shipan 2012), we plan to assess how the scope of the governor’s 
formal power affects unilateral decision making at the statelevel.  
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ENDNOTES 
1. It is possible that had we used dynamic measures of economic performance, such as
the growth of the gross state product and of unemployment rate, rather than the static
versions in the analyses, we would have found a stronger relationship between
economic variables and the use of gubernatorial executive orders. As the effect of
economic factors on unilateral executive behavior is not the main focus of this article,
however, our static measures of the economy are sufficient for a pilot project such as
this. In any case, we do elaborate on these possibilities and on our next steps in this
research agenda in the conclusion section.
2. Because of data limitation, the analyses reported in this section contain executive
orders only from Rhode Island. Also because of limited data, we cannot include any
of the additional control variables shown in Table 1 here in the logistic and
multinomial logistic models.
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Descriptions of Variables in Analyses
Variable Name Description Source 
Female Coded 1 if governor is female Compiled by authors 
Democratic governor Coded 1 if governor is a Democrat Compiled by authors 
Last 6 months 
Coded 1 for a governor’s last 6 months in 
office Compiled by authors 
First 6 months 
Coded 1 for a governor’s first 6 months in 
office Compiled by authors 
Months in office # of months a governor has been in office Compiled by authors 
Party polarization 
(house) 
Ideological distance between party medians 
(lower chamber) 
Shor and McCarty 
(2011) 
Party polarization 
(senate) 
Ideological distance between party medians 
(upper chamber) 
Shor and McCarty 
(2011) 
Divided government 
Coded 1 if all three institutions of state 
government are not controlled by same party Klarner (2013) 
% of legislators in 
governor’s party 
Average percent of legislators across the two 
chambers of the legislature who are members 
of the governor’s party Klarner (2013) 
State population (log) Log of total state population Klarner (2015) 
Gross state product (log) Log of gross state product (in thousands) Klarner (2015) 
% state unemployment State unemployment rate Klarner (2015) 
Table A2. Arizona Governors in Date Range Covered (Apr. 1965–Jan. 2017) 
Governor Party Female Entered Office Left Office 
Samuel P. Goddard Democrat No January 4, 1965 January 2, 1967 
Jack R. Williams Republican No January 2, 1967 January 6, 1975 
Raul H. Castro Democrat No January 6, 1975 October 20, 1977 
Concluded next page 
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Table A2. Arizona Governors in Date Range Covered (Apr. 1965–Jan. 2017), concl. 
Governor Party Female Entered Office Left Office 
Wesley Bolin Democrat No October 20, 1977 March 4, 1978 
Bruce Babbitt Democrat No March 4, 1978 January 5, 1987 
Evan Mecham Republican No January 5, 1987 April 4, 1988 
Rose Mofford Democrat Yes April 4, 1988 March 6, 1991 
Fife Symington Republican No March 6, 1991 September 5, 1997 
Jane Dee Hull Republican Yes September 5, 1997 January 6, 2003 
Janet Napolitano Democrat Yes January 6, 2003 January 21, 2009 
Jane Brewer Republican Yes January 21, 2009 January 5, 2015 
Doug Ducey Republican No January 5, 2015 Incumbent 
Table A3. List of New Hampshire Governors in Date Range Covered (Jan. 1991–
Dec. 2016) 
Governor Party Female Entered Office Left Office 
Judd Gregg Republican No January 4, 1989 January 2, 1993 
Ralph D. Hough Republican No January 2, 1993 January 7, 1993 
Stephen Merrill Republican No January 7, 1993 January 9, 1997 
Jeanne Shaheen Democrat Yes January 9, 1997 January 9, 2003 
Craig Benson Republican No January 9, 2003 January 6, 2005 
John Lynch Democrat No January 6, 2005 January 3, 2013 
Margaret Hassan Democrat Yes January 3, 2013 January 2, 2017 
Table A4. New Mexico Governors in Date Range Covered (Jan. 2011–Dec. 2016) 
Governor Party Female Entered Office Left Office 
Susana Martinez Republican Yes January 1, 2011 Incumbent 
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Table A5. Oklahoma Governors in Date Range Covered (Nov. 1959–Nov. 2016) 
Governor Party Female Entered Office Left Office 
J. Howard
Edmondson Democrat No January 12, 1959 January 6, 1963 
George Nigh Democrat No January 6, 1963 January 14, 1963 
Henry Bellmon Republican No January 14, 1963 January 9, 1967 
Dewey F. Bartlett Republican No January 9, 1967 January 11, 1971 
David Hall Democrat No January 11, 1971 January 13, 1975 
David L. Boren Democrat No January 13, 1975 January 8, 1979 
George Nigh Democrat No January 8, 1979 January 12, 1987 
Henry Bellmon Republican No January 12, 1987 January 14, 1991 
David Walters Democrat No January 14, 1991 January 9, 1995 
Frank Keating Republican No January 9, 1995 January 13, 2003 
Brad Henry Democrat No January 13, 2003 January 10, 2011 
Mary Fallin Republican Yes January 10, 2011 Incumbent 
Table A6. Oregon Governors in Date Range Covered (Feb. 2003–Sept. 2016) 
Governor Party Female Entered Office Left Office 
Ted Kulongoski Democrat No January 13, 2003 January 10, 2011 
John Kitzhaber Democrat No January 10, 2011 February 18, 2015 
Kate Brown Democrat Yes February 18, 2015 Incumbent 
Table A7. Rhode Island Governors in Date Range Covered (Jan. 1973–Jan. 2017) 
Governor Party Female Entered Office Left Office 
Philip W. Noel Democrat No January 2, 1973 January 4, 1977 
J. Joseph Garrahy Democrat No January 4, 1977 January 1, 1985 
Edward D. DiPrete Republican No January 1, 1985 January 1, 1991 
Bruce Sundlun Democrat No January 1, 1991 January 3, 1995 
Lincoln C. Almond Republican No January 3, 1995 January 7, 2003 
Donald Carcieri Republican No January 7, 2003 January 4, 2011 
Lincoln Chafee Democrat No January 4, 2011 January 6, 2015 
Gina Raimondo Democrat Yes January 6, 2015 Incumbent 
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Table A8. South Carolina Governors in Date Range Covered (Mar. 1973–Oct. 2016) 
Governor Party Female Entered Office Left Office 
John West Democrat No January 19, 1971 January 21, 1975 
James Edwards Republican No January 21, 1975 January 10, 1979 
Richard Riley Democrat No January 10, 1979 January 14, 1987 
Carroll Campbell Republican No January 14, 1987 January 11, 1995 
David Beasley Republican No January 11, 1995 January 13, 1999 
Jim Hodges Democrat No January 13, 1999 January 15, 2003 
Mark Sanford Republican No January 15, 2003 January 12, 2011 
Nikki Haley Republican Yes January 12, 2011 January 24, 2017 
